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Abstract 
This article examines two redistributive programs: Negative Income Tax 
and Universal Basic Income. Its aim is to show that, even if the two 
programs – through the implementation of an appropriate tax-benefit system 
– can get the same distributive outcome, they are deeply different both from 
an economic point of view and an ethic perspective. The approach adopted 
integrates positive and normative analysis so that an explicit attention to 
ethical issues can provide a more complete descriptive economics. We show 
that Negative Income Tax scheme is consistent with the libertarian idea of 
distributive justice, while Basic Income matches with the egalitarian 
thought. 
 Introduction 
In recent years, the debate about welfare state systems reforms led to several 
proposal of adopting tax-benefit programs, that is schemes that integrate 
social transfer and fiscal withdrawal. 
These schemes operate a selective redistribution towards less affluent 
population, eliminating the problem of categoriality that affects many 
welfare systems. Moreover, the coordination between withdrawal and 
benefit insures that the effective marginal tax rate shape does not affect 
negatively the recipients’ labour supply. 
Nevertheless tax-benefit programs, setting selectivity exclusively on income 
parameters and eluding completely an evaluation of wealth, select the target 
of beneficiaries that includes many “false positives”. 
The most known tax-benefit program is the Negative Income Tax. Such 
scheme is based on the determination of an income baseline: to taxpayers 
with an income larger than the baseline are applied normal tax rates. If the 
income is smaller than the baseline, taxpayers receive a benefit (as to say, 
they pay a “negative tax”). The terminological paternity is imputable to 
Friedman (1962). Negative Income Tax has been largely experimented in 
the United States during the last decades (see Moffit, 2003). 
At theoretical level, Universal Basic Income is known as well. It is a lump-
sum transfer, universal and unconditioned. The joint action of benefit and 
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tax system makes this scheme theoretically universal but selective in 
practise. In the last century one of the most well known proposal of basic 
income is that of Lady Rhys Williams (1943). She proposed an integrated 
social security and taxation system extended to all British citizens. With this 
system they should have received a social dividend, according to the 
principle that “the state owes the same benefit to all the citizens”. However, 
Lady Rhys Williams proposal foresaw that all the unemployed but able to 
work citizens should have accepted the job offered by the Minister of Work 
or lose the benefit (Rhys Williams, 1953). 
By planning an appropriate system of tax rates and benefits it is possible to 
get the same net income for each level of gross income both from Negative 
Income Tax and Universal Basic Income: the poorest part of the population 
should receive a benefit, while the affluents should pay a tax. Milton 
Friedman recently argued (Suplicy, 2000) that the Universal Basic Income 
can be a way to implement Negative Income Tax. As well, Jaquet et al 
(2000, p.78) argued that if a Universal Basic Income cannot be implemented 
for political reasons, Negative Income Tax could be an alternative minimal 
way to fulfil the same aim.1 
                                                 
1 It is noticeable that Van Parijs, in the same Suplicy’s paper, comments Friedman’s point of view 
arguing that the economic equivalence between the two programs should not hide that the effect of 
the two alternatives on the recipients is not the same because of the different timing of payments: ex-
ante in the case of Basic Income, ex-post for what concerns Negative Income Tax. 
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Also for this reason, a lexical confusion arose recently in distinguishing the 
two schemes. Atkinson (1995) calls basic income a program that instead 
appears like a Negative Income tax associated to a flat rate tax system. 
Editing the Italian translation of Atkinson’s book, Rossi (1998) calls the 
same program “minimum guaranteed income”. This is a term usually used 
in economic literature (see for instance Moffit, 2002) to identify a program 
ensuring to all the individuals with an income under a certain threshold to 
have a post-transfer income equal to a certain sum of money. For this 
reason, the minimum guaranteed income appears as a special case of 
Negative Income Tax with a marginal tax rate of 100 per cent for all the 
recipients. 
This article is aimed at showing that, Negative Income Tax and Universal 
Basic Income are two very different redistributive programs, both from an 
economic and distributive point of view and from an ethic and distributive 
justice perspective. 
The adopted approach has the aim of integrating positive analysis issues 
with normative elements because an explicit attention to ethical 
considerations – that shape human values and behaviours – can provide a 
more complete descriptive economics. 
The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 1 shows how the same distributive result of Negative Income Tax 
and Universal Basic Income it is obtainable – both in a flat rate or in a 
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progressive system – only allowing a much larger transfer total cost in the 
case of Universal Basic Income. 
In section 2 we prove that imposing the same total cost to the two programs 
(as to say indifference between the two schemes in terms of public 
expenditure), the distributive effects are quite different. 
The difference in terms of redistributive effects is referable to different 
distributive justice backgrounds. The ethical thesis that lies behind Negative 
Income Tax and Universal Basic Income is referable to a different approach 
to the concept of freedom (section 3) and to uncertainty theory (section 4). 
Sections 5 and 6 show that Negative Income Tax proposal draw its 
inspiration from the libertarian thought (section 5) while Universal Basic 
Income derives from an egualitarian kind of distributive justice. 
Section 7 concludes.  
1. Negative Income Tax and Universal Basic Income schemes 
Negative Income Tax (henceforth: NIT) and Universal Basic Income 
(hencefoth: UBI) functioning schemes, can be seen as two tax system 
respectively associated to a  tax deduction and a tax detraction. 
Assuming, for simplicity a linear tax system, in the NIT scheme the benefit 
is determined according to the equation 
YtGB °−=    if  (1) kY ≤≤0
)( YktB −⋅°= if Y  (2) k≥
Where B is the net benefit (with negative sign) or the tax paid (with positive 
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sign), Y is the gross income, G is the maximum amount of NIT, accorded to 
individuals with zero income, k is the deduction and t° is the tax rate. 
In the UBI scheme, the benefit is computed according to the equation 
  (3) YtgB '−=
for any value of Y, where t’ is the tax rate and g is the fixed and universal 
level of benefit (detraction). 
Observing the post-redistribution disposable incomes, it is possible to see 
that the two schemes can be indifferent in terms of redistributive outcomes. 
For UBI the disposable or post-tax income, Yd, will be  
YtgBYYd )'1( −+=+= .  (4) 
For NIT will be  
ktYtBYYd °+°−=+= )1(  (5) 
Imposing t’=t°, the equilibrium between the two programs will be g=t°k, 
that is the disposable income equivalence condition between  a deduction 
and a detraction. Implementing this equivalence, it is possibile to get two 
schemes of UBI and NIT that give the same disposable income for any gross 
income, and that therefore show the same marginal and average taxation 
level, as proposed by Tobin (1965).2 Even in a more realistic progressive tax 
system, it’s possible to get the same redistributive effect (see figure 1). 
                                                 
2 Tobin proposed an allowance of 400 US$ and a first income bracket up to 1200 US$ with a 
marginal tax rate of  del 33,3 per cent. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
 In the NIT case a proportional transfer (area OGE) is observable. It 
decreases with income at a rate –t and it is equal to zero when income Y is 
equal to the deduction k. Over this threshold, the taxpayers pay a positive 
tax, measured by the area EMN, where the corner created by the intersection 
between the 45° line and the disposable income segment measures the tax 
rate.  
In the UBI case, the allowance of a universal and unconditioned transfer 0g 
to all the individuals, moves up the 45° line, that now shows the equality 
between disposable income and gross income plus UBI. After the 
redistribution, individuals with gross income smaller than OE will get a 
positive benefit arising from the difference between the sum of UBI (that is 
Og) and the tax paid, measured by the vertical distance between the 
translated 45° line and the segment gM. Taxpayers withy an income larger 
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than OE will pay a net tax. The net cost of the UBI program will be equal to 
the area OKE . 
Therefore, in a tax-benefit system with progressive tax system, it’s possible 
to get the same distributive outcomes and the same marginal and average 
tax rates (figure 3) indifferently from a NIT scheme or a UBI scheme. 
Comparison between the two redistributive programs, the first selective and 
the latter universalistic, becomes a comparison between two universalistic 
schemes, with an anomalous shape of marginal tax rates at the bottom of the 
redistribution, since the first bracket’s tax rate is higher than the second. 
Also the distinction of the role of the taxpayer/recipients under the two 
hypothesis becomes appearing. Under the NIT program the presence of an 
income threshold discriminates beneficiaries and taxpayers, while under the 
UBI scheme all the individuals are at the same time recipients and 
taxpayers. 
It is useful to observe that in the UBI program the area  OgE=GMN-OGPQ 
is equivalent to the total cost of the benefit in the NIT scheme, OGE. 
Assuming a uniform distribution of population along the income scale, the 
net cost of the two programs is the same. Nevertheless, the total cost is 
hugely lager in the UBI case, since OgPQ>OGE. Loosely speaking, 
although the net cost of the two programs is equivalent, in the UBI case the 
total amount of benefit allowed to the population is higher.  
Such aspect does not have any relevance for the recipient, but has important 
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consequences concerning the public budget.  
Infact, for the recipient, the UBI scheme is exactly the same that could be 
observable in a NIT scheme, in which only the net balance between tax and 
benefit is an effective expenditure for social transfer (when the benefit is 
larger than the tax paid) or a revenue for the government (when the benefit 
is smaller than the tax paid). 
For the national accounts, instead, in a UBI scheme tax and benefit are 
separated, so they affect the balance both as expenditure and as revenue. 
The consequence is an apparent (and undesirable) growth of fiscal pressure, 
if compared with NIT, even if the net cost is the same. That important issue 
of political feasibility makes the NIT schemes preferable. UBI proposal 
could be few appealing for trade unions and public opinion, even if a great 
part of this scarce success is attributable to the individual non-perception of 
the substantial expenditure equivalence between the two schemes (Jaquet et 
al., 2000).  Several alternative ways can be used to finance the larger gross 
cost of a UBI scheme and favouring its political feasibility. For instance, 
one could be to finance UBI with revenues earned from an asset commonly 
shared by the population e.g. using the royalties gained from the oil 
extraction3. Alternatively, it could implement a UBI program whose total 
                                                 
3 It’s the case of the Permanent Fund Dividend Program implemented in Alaska in 1980 executive 
since 1982. The Fund provides an allowance to all the citizens. In 2000 the dividend reached is 
maximum sum, equal to 1.936,86 US$ per capita (Del Bò, 2004). 
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cost be identical to the cost of the benefit of an hypothetical NIT program. 
Such proposal is explained in the next section and proves how the 
distributive effects of the two programs are deeply different. 
2. Tax-benefit model with parity of total cost 
In order to impose that the sum of the benefit supplied in a NIT program is 
equivalent to the sum of the benefit (tax credit) supplied in a UBI program 
means implementing the two programs according to the constraint 
∑
≤
⋅=⋅−
kyi
i
i
ngytG
|
)( o  (6) 
Where n is the population and i is the i-th individual with pre-tax income 
smaller than k. Tax rates for incomes excluded by the benefit (in NIT) and 
for all the incomes level (in UBI) do not affect the constraint, hence can be 
considered equal in the two cases.  Arranging the above equation, the 
constraint will be  
n
ytG
g kyi
i
i
∑
≤
⋅−
= |
)( o
 (7) 
The basic income g is inversely proportional to the population and to the 
negative tax rate t°, and directly proportional to the benefit G given to 
people with zero-income and to the sum k for which NIT becomes zero. 
Hence, UBI benefit should be smaller than the maximum level of transfer 
accorded to people with zero income. In figures 4 and 5, the area OGE of 
the NIT scheme is equivalent to the area 0gPQ of the UBI scheme, 
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assuming, as in the previous section, a normal distribution of the 
individuals. 
FIGURE 4 
 
FIGURE 5 
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However, if compared with the case of the previous section, the disposable 
income here represented by the segment GEM e gEM is different in the two 
cases, as well as the shape of marginal and average tax rates (figures 6, 7, 
8). 
A NIT scheme makes better off individuals with a low pre-tax income. But 
beyond V NIT makes worse off the individuals, that receive a larger 
disposable income under the UBI option. In the same way, average tax rates 
are smaller in the NIT scheme for income smaller than V and lager in the 
opposite case. Marginal taxation is different only for NIT recipients but is 
the same for all the other individuals.4  
FIGURE 6 
 
                                                 
4 This is due to the to the “traditional” design of NIT programs, that is use to allow to the recipients a 
negative tax rate incluse in a range of 50-70 per cent. 
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FIGURE 7 
 
FIGURE 8 
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Hence, imposing parity of total cost of the benefit, the two schemes are 
equivalent concerning the effect on public budget and on tax burden. But 
relevant differences arise for what concerns the distributive effects and the 
incentive structure. 
Concerning the incentive to work, it is important to observe how the two 
schemes differently affect labour supply. Using a neoclassical model 
(Moffit, 2002), the individuals have a utility function depending on 
consumption ( )C  and leisure ( )L . They faces the budget constraint 
 (8) EwQP i
N
i
i +=∑
=
)(
1
LT −
where Pi and Qi are the prices and the quantities of each of the N 
purchasable goods, w is the gross hourly wage, E is the non-labour income 
and T-L is the number of hours worked. Assuming the absence of savings, 
the left-hand side of the equation is equal to the total income of the 
individual, Y. Defining the hours worked as LTH −= , we get the 
preference function U  such that Y),( YH wHE +=   
A NIT program provides to each individual that works less than a certain 
number of hours a benefit  
)( EwHtGB +−=  (9) 
where G is the sum granted to the individuals that work for zero hours and t 
is the marginal tax rate.  
Arranging the budget constraint by hours worked, we get  
w
E
tw
BGH −−=  if 
t
G<Y  (10) 
w
EYH −=  if  
t
G≥Y  (11) 
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In the UBI program, for any value of Y, labour supply will be 
w
E
tw
BgH −−=  (12) 
It is to prove that, with the same net cost, for the individuals with income 
smaller than G/t, labour supply is lower in the NIT case. Beyond this point, 
labour supply is larger in the UBI case up to B>g-tY, after it will be larger in 
the NIT case again. 
From the distributive point of view, the constraint of parity of budget 
provides distributive outcomes that stress how NIT program pays attention 
only to the bottom part of the distribution, charged by high marginal tax 
rates, while the UBI program distributes income also to the middle part of 
the distribution. 
So, the design of the two programs seems to suggest that in a NIT program a 
minority of “poor” citizens is financed by people with middle and high pre-
tax income. In a UBI program, a minority of citizens (the richest) 
redistribute part of their income to people with lower income. 
The higher efficiency in fighting poverty by NIT and in the meanwhile, the 
presence of high marginal tax rates on low incomes reduce labour supply of 
the same individuals. On the other side, lower benefit for poor people, as in 
the UBI case, associated with lower marginal tax rate, incentive the 
presence of low-income people on labour market. 
Moreover, the preference for a program as NIT seems to show a 
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redistribution which is concentrated on a range of low-income people. In 
absence of a legal constraint to accept the job offered by the government, no 
personal effort in terms of a more intensive labour supply is requested to 
these individuals. Opposite to this model of “residual welfare” there is a 
UBI scheme, less efficient in raising the low incomes, but more sensitive to 
the issues of inequality and of social inclusion, supporting labour supply and 
citizenship. 
The different effects concerning incentives and redistribution prove that the 
two programs analysed, although often used as synonymous, are referable to 
very different ethics and normative thesis, which suggest opposite 
distributive justice and welfare models. 
Next sections investigate ethic and normative elements from which derive 
the two programs of UBI and NIT. 
3. Negative and positive freedoms 
A first factor of differentiation between the ethical background of UBI and 
NIT concerns the thought about freedom attached to the two programs. 
Thinking about freedom from a negative point of view means to consider a 
person free when, in accomplish its action, she is not thwarted by any other 
individual or group (to be free from). Underlining the concept of negative 
freedom is a constitutive characteristic of the libertarian thought. The author 
that in last century theorised in the boldest and most influential way the 
libertarianism as a theory of justice was Robert Nozick. In his famous 
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Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) he proposed the libertarian society as the 
unique kind of society able to maximize the individual choices, departing 
from the supremacy of individual rights. 
Such a result should be granted by a “minimal state”, whose exclusive 
function should be to ensure the respect of three property principles. 
The first is the principle of the property of himself, a system of property 
rights able to ensure the full right of individual property, other peoples’ 
freedom permitting. But that principle, by himself is not able to accomplish 
the libertarian project. Two principles that regulate the property of all the 
other “external goods” are necessary. 
The first is a principle of right circulation and says that the legitimate 
property of a good can be obtained both buying it with a voluntary 
transaction or creating it utilizing only her capability and other goods 
previously bought. 
The third is a principle of initial acquisition able to provide consistency to 
the property rights, since the theoretical structure built up to now has 
internal consistency assuming that the previous owners’ property rights be 
legitimate. In the case of goods still without owner, a compensation for the 
non-buyers be requested (lockean proviso). 
Buchanan (1985) stresses the conceptual distinction through negative 
freedom and positive freedom (to be free to do): the former case is the 
absence of constraints imposed by institutions or individuals. In the latter, 
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the focus is on the possibility to do, the abilities, the means, the 
opportunities owned by a person. 
Hence, there is a huge difference between who does not consider the 
positive aspect of freedom (like Buchanan), and who stresses the 
fundamental importance of the positive side (like Sen or Roemer, for 
instance), considering an individual not free when she does not own the 
means necessary to pursue an aim, even if nobody else – individual or 
institution – puts obstacles in her way. 
Positive freedoms can be defined as opportunities and for their 
maximization require a redistributive action. On the other side, negative 
freedoms can be defined as self-determination and simply ask the 
implementation of an appropriate legal frame and a public power able to 
make it respected. 
4. The approach to uncertainty 
A second, deep, furrow that ethically divides UBI and NIT concerns the 
approach to uncertainty. 
Strongly redistributive opinions, as those expressed by Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice (1971) see the redistribution as a consequence of the extreme risk-
aversion of the individuals. Rawls (1971) theorizes that rational and 
individualistic agents, if called to choose impartially the fundamental rules 
of a constitution, unanimously will choose to set up a state in which 
distributive justice be in its constitutive aims. 
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Such a choice would be ensured by the hypothesis that the agents make their 
choices behind a veil of ignorance. Rawls assumes that the agents do not 
know their place in the society or their social status as well as their fortune 
in the distribution of natural resources such as cleverness or talents. 
Moreover, in Rawls’ theory nobody knows her opinion about goodness and 
neither her psychological preferences, as risk aversion, or the propensity to 
optimism or pessimism. Agents do not know the specific circumstances of 
the society which they live in, like the political and economic situation, the 
civic and the cultural level that the society reached. The unique facts known 
by individuals are the political problems, the basics of economic theory, of 
social organization and of human psychology. Finally, they know all the 
factors affecting the choice of the principles of justice. 
Rawls thinks that, in these circumstances, the individuals should agree – on 
the basis of rational and personal interests – on the presence of institutions 
devoted to the redistribution of the products and the benefits obtained from 
arbitrary distribution of ability and talent, whatever shape the redistribution 
assumes. This assumption is consequential to Rawls’ opinion that 
individuals act exclusively with the aim of getting personal scopes. But, 
being behind a veil of ignorance that does not allow the knowledge of any 
information beyond the moral thought, they will converge unanimously on a 
social contract: obligations will be accepted by everybody because everyone 
contributed in a free and equal part to its elaboration. 
20 
 
 
Harsanyi criticised Rawls’s theory asserting that an agent in the original 
position should not necessarily think that her position be determined by a 
rational competitors rather than a casual process. Moreover, he is doubtful 
about the assumption that any individual behind the veil of ignorance will 
believe to be in the worst position. Harsanyi says that if such a thought is 
consistent with the outcome of every agent, she should get the same utility 
level of any other agent. Hence, Rawls’ principle of difference would  fall. 
The conceptual difference between Rawls and Harsanyi is attributable to the 
different veil of ignorance’s consistency.  
In Rawls’ theory the veil of ignorance excludes any knowledge of the 
probability, both in the determination of the kind of society and in his 
position in it. This assumption produces a high risk aversion, hence the 
individuals will not attribute any value to all they could get beyond the 
minimum and they are aimed only to avoid the worst outcome they could 
get. 
Harsanyi (1975) judges this theory not relievable in real people’s behaviour. 
He stresses that under these conditions, an individual should not neither be 
dispoded to cross the road, if there is a very small probability to be run over 
by a car, and independently on any eventual compensation by the car driver. 
Since this kind of behaviour would be absurd in real life, it is doubtful to 
apply it to a decisional rule in the original position. 
Hence, Harsany assumes that everybody has a different risk-propensity and 
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not a common and very high aversion justifying an highly redistributive 
economic environment. Friedman (1962) agrees with this opinion. He 
argues that the market solution, rather than the redistributive, produces 
equality of treatment among individuals. Friedman’s solution can be seen as 
a lottery. The agents, endowed of equal resources, bet different amounts of 
money on different outcomes. The distributive outcome is originated by the 
different individual preferences on uncertainty. A redistribution successive 
to the lottery outcome, in Friedman’s opinion, would deny to individuals the 
opportunity of betting on the lottery according to their own tastes. So, 
individuals choose employment status, investments, etc. according to their 
(different) risk aversion. 
5. Negative Income Tax as consequence of libertarianism  
From the previous sections arise that a) adopting as ethical foundation the 
concept of negative freedom rather than that of positive freedom, and b) 
basing the uncertainty approach on the field of probability rather than that of 
risk aversion behind a veil of ignorance, different distributive justice 
solutions come out. 
Preferences for negative freedoms and probabilistic approach to uncertainty 
presuppose joining to libertarian principle. 
Libertarians strongly refuse any kind of equality different from the equality 
of rights. For this reason, any public redistributive scheme based on an 
element of compulsory fiscal imposition is not consistent with the idea of a 
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free society. In a libertarian state institutions should have only the mission 
to incentive a large and free redistribution process from the rich to the poor 
based on charity.5 The charitative process would be decisively inhibited 
from a direct state intervention. Hence, although redistribution is admitted, 
it can derive only from individuals. The maximum freedom of which any 
individual benefits makes her able to make philanthropy or to get utility 
from living in a society in which a more equal wealth distribution prevents 
crimes or social troubles. 
Hence, redistribution is completely delegate to individual choices. The 
“minimal state” will not implement any redistributive fiscal state but only 
share equally the cost of its activities among the members, to whom is 
ensured a consistent and organic protection systems.6  
The right measure of redistribution will be the charity and philanthropic 
activities that citizens will decide to implement. But on the other side the 
                                                 
5 It needs to underline that the empirical prove to this hypothesis is very weak . However, the central 
role played by negative freedoms – that in the opinion of Van Parjis and Arnsperger (2000) are 
supposed to be the fruit of a “feticisme of rights” – is so huge in the libertarian thought  that neither in 
presence of enormous inequalities no violation of rights is admitted. 
6 The aim that the state does not go beyond its essential tasks has been renewed since the’50s by the 
new theories that saw the state as a modern Leviatan starting from the contributes of economists of 
the public choices as Brennan and Buchanan. Basing their thesis on the idea that in the capitalistic 
states public sector grown up in a measure dangerous for the individual freedom, they argued the 
necessity of a new social contract based on the reduction of public intervention through a “fiscal 
constitution” aimed at limitino the fiscal liability and a new definition of individual rights.  
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externalities generated by philanthropy are not compensated by the payment 
of a price by the beneficiaries of the externality. Free-riding problems arise 
and a public redistributive action becomes necessary. 
The space for the state intervention will be constrained by the aim of 
preserving as more as possible the characteristics of the libertarianism. 
hence, the constraints to public redistribution will be several.  
First of all, redistribution will exclude any form of categoriality and needs. 
In this sense eventual innate disadvantages of the individuals are not 
considered. This means that there will be no difference through 
disadvantages of which the person is responsible (e.g. scarce effort) or she is 
not (e.g. innate talent).  
Secondly, the link with the market should be as weak as possible, 
implementing a redistributive system that that does not obstruct it and be not 
price-distorsive. Consequently minimum wage schemes, tariffs, in-kind 
programs, fiscal progressivity are excluded. 
Finally, the role of the state should be as less invasive as possible: the 
administrative costs concerning the redistributive system, the selection of 
the target of beneficiaries and of distribution of the program must be 
minimized, since an enlargement of the public actions and influence means 
a departure from the minimal state. 
For Friedman, The program that ensures the respect of all these constraints, , 
is that of Negative Income Tax: to determine a level of exemptions and 
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deductions from the imposable income and to tax only the part of it that 
exceeds the threshold. In the case income is smaller than the threshold, the 
taxpayer will pay a negative tax, that is she will receive a subsidy equal to a 
rate computed on the difference between income and threshold. 
Friedman (1962) points out the advantages of this program: it is orientated 
to the poverty alleviation; to give a help in the useful way – that is with a 
cash transfer; it is a general program and makes explicit the cost afforded by 
the society. The NIT program reduces the incentive for poor people to help 
by themselves, but it does not drop completely the incentive, as it makes a 
system of guaranteed minimum income.7 
A system so conceived concentrate the public intervention only on the 
poorest income of the distribution, that substitutes private charity, 
smoothing on the whole society the cost sustained to produce the positive 
externality of a less unequal society. 
Selection of the beneficiaries is consistent with a redistributive system that 
is residual, built inside an ethical frame exclusively devoted to grant the 
maximum space for negative freedoms. Hence, modifications to the primary 
distribution are not desired – being distorsive of the situation arose from the 
free acting – but are considered the price to pay to avoid the free-riding of 
                                                 
7 Although Friedman did not give a numerical example of NIT in his book of 1962, successively 
proposed a transfer that for a four-member family with zero income should be equal to 3.600 US$ per 
year (US dollars 1978) and a negative tax rate of  50 per cent. 
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private redistributive action. 
6. Equality of opportunity and Universal Basic Income 
In last decades, egualitarian thought proposed several distributive 
hypothesis.8 Dworkin, supporter of equality of resources, implements a 
universalistic redistribution based on assurance. Programs aimed at 
equalizing opportunities, as those proposed by Roemer, propose a selective 
redistribution in which resources are transferred till all the individuals show 
the same level of opportunity (“levelling the playing field”). Other 
contributes, such as Fleurbaey and Bossert, tried to build a concept of 
distributive justice that distinguishes the variables whom the individuals are 
responsible (e.g. productive effort) from these of which they are not (e.g 
innate talents), hence defined responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. 
If compared with UBI, these programs are different because of their 
selective pattern and the differentiation of the individual transfer. In an 
egualitarian frame, the UBI roots can be found in the thought of Van Parijs 
                                                 
8 See Maguain (2002) for a recent survey. 
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(1991, 1992, 1995).9 His contribute is linked with the egualitarianism à la 
Rawls and to equality of opportunities, but start from an enlargement of the 
libertarian concept of freedom. 
Van Parijs merges in his analysis the concept of negative freedoms (called 
autodetermination), positive freedoms (opportunities), and security, that is 
the axiom that says that no individual or institution or group can take 
possession of other people’s property (Rothbard, 1973). 
He sums up these three concepts using the terms of real freedom, in contrast 
with the idea of formal freedom, that excludes completely opportunities 
from its definition. Hence, a society can be considered free when a) a clear 
and consolidated structure of rights exists; b) such a structure of rights is 
conformed such that every person is able to decide her own choices; c) such 
a structure of rights give to each person the largest range of opportunities as 
possible to do whatever she wants. 
Point (c) links the libertarian thought, enlarged by Van Parijs that in contrast 
                                                 
9 A justification for UBI can be found, in the libertarian field, in the current that, referring to Paine 
(1796), refused the lockean proviso since in their opinion every man owns an equal right to the earth 
resources. Hence, every appropriation of goods before owned by nobody, must be compensated by 
the payment of a tax, whose amounts is related to the value of the natural resources acquired. The tax 
value would be determined on the basis of the price at which the natural resources acquired are 
evaluated in an hypothetical perfect competition market. The revenues should be redistributed equally 
among all citizens. In practise, this would be a UBI financed by an land tax. Such idea recently has 
been proposed by Steiner (1994) and Vallentyne (1998). 
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with Nozick and Buchanan called it real libertarianism, to Rawls’ (1971) 
principle of difference. In order to get a society as free as possible (that is a 
society in which every single member be as free as possible) it needs to 
adopt a criterion that establishes that individual with less freedom 
opportunities must have an opportunity level not smaller than that enjoyed 
by the person with less opportunity in what else social state. If a social state 
that offers the same level opportunities to the person that has the less exists, 
the same criterion is applied to the individual that is placed in the last 
position but one, and so on (leximin-opportunity). 
Finally, considering the possible conflict that can arise through the three 
conditions, a society is defined “free” when individual opportunities are 
leximinized under the constraint of protection of formal freedom, that is the 
structure of rights incorporating autodetermination. 
The redistributive program above depicted does not determine equality of 
results for two reasons. The former is that imposing formal freedom creates 
a constraint to every attempt of equalization. The latter is the fact that real 
libertarianism focuses on opportunities rather than distributive outcomes, 
measured for instance in terms of income, welfare, or choices. 
The concept of real freedom thought by Van Parijs does not concern 
freedom of chosing different baskets of goods a person would like to 
consume, but freedom of choice among the various life a person could live. 
This distinction, apparently subtle, attributes a fundamental importance to 
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the unconditionality of redistribution.  
To assume that an individual is really free when she owns both means and 
rights to do what she wants, the natural consequence is choose to leximin 
nothing else than people’s purchasing power under the constraint of 
personal formal freedoms. This means to raise the lowest income 
compatibly with a request of unconditionality.  
Hence, the solution proposed is an unconditioned income transfer, 
consistent with security and autodetermination. Such proposal – named in 
several ways (“state bonus”, “social dividend”, “citizenship income”, 
“universal income”) is called by Van Parijs as “basic income”10  
It is noticeable that the definition of UBI here used, is not linked to any 
definition of basic needs, since the level of UBI can be larger or smaller 
than the subsistence threshold, according to the constraint that determine its 
level. 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper proved that Negative Income Tax and Universal Basic Income 
can present the same distributive outcome implementing an appropriate 
system of tax and benefits, but nevertheless they are two programs deeply 
different both from economic and ethic point of view. 
                                                 
10 The name Basic Income, in the sense here used, seems to be used for the first time by Tinbergen 
(1953). The same term has had a large use in the Flemish translation since the middle of the ‘70s, and 
has been imported in the international economic literature by Parker (1982). 
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Imposing the same net cost for both the schemes, in NIT a minority of poor 
individuals is financed by middle and high income taxpayer. In UBI the 
most affluent individuals redistribute income to middle  and low income 
individuals. 
Low incomes labour supply is reduced more intensively by a NIT program 
than by UBI one. 
So different results under both the distributive and the incentives point of 
view are consistent with a different ethical background. NIT, in the design 
made by Friedman, find its inspiration in the libertarian thesis, that 
underlines the central role played by rights and negative freedoms and that 
judge redistribution as a distortion of individual preference about 
uncertainty. UBI is a direct emanation of egualitarian theories, that stress the 
role of positive freedoms (opportunities) and presuppose a strong risk-
aversion under a veil of ignorance, so that a highly redistributive state is 
requested. 
From such difference arises the need to underline the epistemological 
differentiation of the two programs, even when from their implementation 
come out identical (or at least similar) distributive outcomes. 
Treating as the same way two programs that derive from antithetical 
thoughts about justice and ethics, risks to induce confusion about the real 
distributive aims that the policy maker wants to achieve. Such a conclusion 
is indirectly confirmed by Milton Friedman himself, when he says that 
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The liberal will therefore distinguish sharply between equality of right and 
equality of opportunity, on the one hand, and material equality or equality of 
outcome on the other. He may welcome the fact that a free society in fact tends 
toward greater material equality than any other yet tried. But he will regard this 
as a desirable by-product of a free society, not its major justification. He will 
welcome measures that promote both freedom and equality (…). He will regard 
private charity directed at helping the less fortunate as an example of the proper 
use of freedom. And he may approve state action toward ameliorating poverty 
as a more effective way in which the great bulk of the community can achieve a 
common objective. He will do so with regret, however, at having to substitute 
compulsory for voluntary action. 
The egalitarian will go this far, too. But he will want to go further. He will 
defend taking from some to give to others, not as a more effective means 
whereby the “some” can achieve an objective they want to achieve, but on 
grounds of “justice”. At this point, equality comes sharply into conflict with 
freedom; one must choose. One cannot be both an egalitarian, in this sense, and 
a liberal. 
[Friedman (1962), Capitalism and Freedom, p. 195]. 
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